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ABSTRACT 
The increasing gap between the formerly socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CE & EE) 
with regard to both their economic and political performance cannot be explained by their different start-
ing conditions after the breakdown of the Soviet Union alone. Rather, it is due to cultural and historical 
circumstances that shape the particular tradition and societal environment. Taking a cultural approach and 
referring to the newer literature on the transfer of institutions, we try to improve the understanding of the 
interrelation between formal and informal institutions. Our central thesis is that the ‘reaction rate’ of  
informal institutions depends on their compatibility with imported formal institutions. The transition  
processes in CE & EE can tell us much about the relation between path dependent and politically imple-
mented institutional change. During the 20th century the countries of CE & EE twice went through rapid 
institutional change: For centuries they had acculturated to Western Europe, but as a result of the October 
Revolution ‘Eastern’ patterns were imposed upon them. Since the breakdown of the SU in the late 1980s 
they have ‚returned to Europe‘ by (re-)establishing democracy and capitalism. In our opinion, to under-
stand the differences in performance between the transition countries, it is necessary to interpret both 
transitions as processes of institutional transplantation and ask how the informal institutional settings in 
the different countries interacted with the imported formal institutions.  
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1 Introduction 
 
In the euphoria of the early 1990s the formerly socialist countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe (in the following: CE & EE) were generally expected to quickly turn into de-
mocracies with market economies. The experience of the last 15 years, however, has 
shown that only some of them (the Baltic States, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Croatia) have consistently chosen a reform path that aims at establishing 
Western-type societies. In the cases of Russia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldavia, the Ukrai-
ne, Romania, and Serbia and Montenegro, by contrast, it is not yet clear where the jour-
ney goes. As especially the recent events in the Ukraine have forcefully demonstrated, 
these countries are – albeit to significantly different degrees – still ideologically divided 
on the issue of the appropriate reform strategy: Should one try to develop according to 
Western European and US-American patterns or is this policy doomed to failure becau-
se it does not fit the geographical, historical, cultural and economic conditions of these 
societies?1  
 
The increasing gap between the two groups of transition countries with regard to both 
their economic and political orders cannot be explained by their different starting condi-
tions after the breakdown of the Soviet Union alone. Rather, it also has its causes in the 
cultural and historical circumstances shaping the particular tradition and societal envi-
ronment. Indeed, the experience of transition has led to a growing awareness of the role 
of informal institutions in the process of institutional change in institutional and evolu-
tionary economics (see Roland 2002, 47). Although a lot of work has been done on this 
problem during the last few years, we still do not have a satisfying explanation of the 
role that informal constraints of human behavior play in institutional change.  
 
To clarify this problem further, the course of our argumentation is as follows: When in 
institutional and evolutionary economics the idea of historical and cultural path depend-
ency is applied to the problem of CE & EE transition, it is often overlooked that the 
European nations did never only develop according to the tracks determined by a – 
however defined – ‘cultural heritage’. Rather, they evolved in close political, military 
and economic competition with their neighbors, and this competition time and again 
                                                 
1  In some of the countries mentioned, e.g. Belarus and Russia, clearly the latter approach has taken 
hold, whereas Bulgaria and Romania have decided to continue the ‘Westernizing’ reforms necessary 
for accession to the EU.  
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forced them to adapt to the institutional arrangements of the more successful nations.2 
This is not to say, however, that the idea of historical and cultural path dependency has 
to be rejected. For whenever formal institutions are taken over from abroad, in the 
course of their implementation they mingle with the ‘soil’ of the prevailing informal 
constraints of human behavior and thought, which are determined by the legacies of the 
past. This phenomenon can be described as a transplantation of institutions (see Badie 
[1992] 2000; Polterovich 2001; Djankov et al. 2003, 609-12; Oleinik 2005, forthcom-
ing). According to Vladimir Polterovich’s (2001, 24) definition, institutional trans-
plantation is “the adoption of institutions, that have developed in another institutional 
environment”. The decisive issue then is, how the informal institutional settings in the 
different countries interacted with the imported formal settings. In our view, the often 
made assumption that informal institutions react inertly to changes in the formal institu-
tional settings must be modified. If seen as a transplantation of institutional arrange-
ments, the ‘reaction rate’ of informal institutions depends on their compatibility with 
imported formal institutions.  
 
We will demonstrate this thesis on the example of the transition processes in CE & EE. 
Especially in the economic literature it is often overlooked that in the course of the 20th 
century these countries have gone through two transitions of their political and eco-
nomic orders. Until World War II, especially the countries of CE had more or less suc-
cessfully tried to imitate the Western European political and economic development. 
But as a result of the October Revolution the new Eastern Hegemon forced them to take 
over the Soviet political and economic formal institutions: The voluntary acculturation 
to Western Europe (which nevertheless was also partly the result of political, military 
and economic pressure) was substituted by a forced acculturation to the Soviet Union. 
Since the breakdown of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s all countries of CE & EE, in-
cluding the former Soviet Republics, have initially announced the desire to turn into 
Western-type societies, based on democracy and a market economy. Obviously, the two 
transitions in CE & EE were caused primarily by political events. And still, we will ar-
gue that historical and cultural factors played a decisive role in both transitions, for they 
determined the degree to which the imported institutions could strike roots in the infor-
mal settings prevailing in the receiving countries. 
 
                                                 
2  A good example for this is that in both Prussia and Russia the abolition of serfdom took place after 
devastating defeats in wars. 
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The paper is organized in six sections. After this introduction, the second section will 
give an overview of how institutional economists deal with the problems mentioned 
above and indicate how a cultural theory of economics could contribute to their solu-
tion. In section three we will specify a theoretical approach that tries to explain the mu-
tual relations between formal and informal institutions. This general theoretical frame-
work is purely structural in the sense that it does not include historical and cultural fac-
tors. These factors are included into our analysis in section four, where we apply our 
framework to the transition processes in Central and Eastern Europe. In section five we 
will briefly outline some conclusions for economic policy-making. We will finish our 
paper with a short outlook on the political and theoretical problems before us.  
 
 
2 A cultural theory of economics as the basis for analyzing the transition  
problem 
 
The well-known difference between formal and informal rules emphasizes that within 
the reality of social order, elements of both planned and unplanned, i.e. spontaneous or-
der are to be found (see Hayek 1964 and 1973; cf. Vanberg 1994, chap.7). Obviously, 
formal rules and informal constraints are not separate. On the contrary, they work to-
gether to form institutions that shape human interaction. A crucial element of economic 
development and transition lies in the interaction between formal rules and informal 
constraints. Indeed, with reference to revolutions, North (1990, 91) has already ad-
dressed this as one of the major problems of systemic change in CE & EE.  
 
Perhaps most important of all, the formal rules change, but the informal constraints do 
not. In consequence, there develops an ongoing tension between informal constrains and 
the new formal rules, as many are inconsistent with each other. […] Although a whole-
sale change in the formal rules may take place, at the same time there will be many in-
formal constraints that have great survival tenacity because they still resolve basic ex-
change problems among the participants, be they social, political, or economic. 
 
Accordingly, the insight that future developments are tied to historical experience binds 
(formal) institutional developments to a specific time path, and the developing institu-
tional structure of societies is subject to a “lock-in” or “path dependency”: historical 
events determine the direction of a development in such a way that the first stages trig-
ger a process that is self-strengthening and very difficult to reverse (cf. Arrow 2000, 
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Magnusson and Ottosson 1997). The dynamic characteristics of such a development re-
sult in the persistence of a few individual, contingent events. The insight that individual 
action taking place during social and economic development can only be properly un-
derstood as being interdependent, i.e. as interacting with other individual actions within 
a specific social environment based on a specific development. Therefore, one can 
speak of a “socially embedded individual conception” as proposed e.g. by Granovetter 
(1985). Path dependency does not mean, however, that social development is deter-
mined by the past development of the society in question. If this was the case, rapid in-
stitutional change would be simply impossible. Rather, the theorem of path dependency 
underlines the significance of historical and social contexts, as well as the necessity to 
take these contexts into consideration in economic policy-making: As we will argue in 
section five, it is one of the prerequisites of successful political agenda-setting to be 
aware of the informal rules that form the soil in which newly established formal rules 
must strike roots. Specific institutional cultures – and this is to be seen with transition 
processes – are not necessarily successful when transferred to other social environ-
ments. Now, it is clear that path dependencies appear to be due mainly to informal rules. 
Because informal constraints are created through a long-term process, they provide “fer-
tile ground” for path dependent developments.  
 
Although new institutional economics was successful in shifting the focus away from 
the neoclassical question of the optimal allocation of specific resources it is left with a 
residual variable when it comes to why in some places, or periods of time, institutional 
change (often initiated by the “transfer” of institutions from abroad) adapted very 
quickly to the challenges of economic growth, and why in other places, or other periods 
of time, obsolete institutions persisted for a long time and left no place for the success-
ful implementation of new institutions. The genesis of culture and of the set of con-
straints that are passed down from one generation to the next is hardly taken into con-
sideration in this approach, either. Because of the long-term perspective of cultural phe-
nomena, it is concluded that culture can be externalized and merely viewed as some-
thing static. By doing so, new institutional economics is at risk of repeating a mistake 
found in most empirical and neoclassical-oriented studies on the influence of culture in 
economic development (cf. Klump 2002): culture appears as an ad hoc-variable that is 
used to explain unusual developments, but a variable that cannot itself be explained. 
There is an insufficient understanding of culture itself. In other words: Culture is not 
merely a factor which can organize social life in a peaceful and productive – and hence 
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cooperative – way. Rather, culture’s structural importance for societal and political pro-
cesses themselves ought to be appreciated.  
 
Friedrich August von Hayek’s evolutionary social philosophy offers a good starting 
point for an appropriate understanding of “culture”. He stresses that cultural develop-
ment always implies – contrary to biological evolution – the passing on of acquired 
characteristics, – “characteristics in the form of rules guiding the mutual relation among 
individuals which are not innate but learnt“ (Hayek 1988, 25). Referring to Karl Popper 
(1972) Hayek accordingly views cultural evolution as a process simulating “Lamarck-
ism”, namely handing down acquired characteristics. By doing so, he underlines the 
uniqueness of cultural processes towards rules of behavior that improve social life. This 
process of spontaneous development is to be understood as a “decentralized process 
where, within a society or polity, different individuals or groups of persons experiment 
with alternative practices” (Vanberg 2001, 80). Thus, “cultural evolution is not the re-
sult of human reason consciously building institutions, but a process in which culture 
and reason developed concurrently … . It is probably no more justified to claim that 
thinking man has created his culture than that culture created his reason“ (Hayek, 1979, 
155).  
 
With this in mind we can now develop a qualitatively more comprehensive understand-
ing of culture that may be applied to newer developments in social science as well as in 
evolutionary anthropology. If culture is understood as a dynamic, path dependent and 
constraining process, as more than just a set of informal rules, then – in Hayek’s per-
spective – the reception and construction processes of human development will come to 
the fore. This evolutionary perspective on culture is promising because it can be used to 
describe a “cumulative cultural evolution”. Evolutionary anthropology speaks of a 
ratchet effect (Tomasello 1999). In contrast to the animal world “human cultural tradi-
tions may be most readily distinguished … precisely by the fact that they accumulate 
modifications over time, that is to say, they have cultural ‚histories’”. (Tomasello 1999, 
40). The “social genesis of the subject’s structure” (Dux 2003, 252) also helps to better 
define the behavior of subject and society: “The subject forms in a society under the 
conditions of this society. Society, however, does not build this process; it is the subject 
itself that does it” (idem 255). Accordingly, we will understand culture not as a resid-
uum of vague traditions but as the ongoing interplay between formal and informal insti-
tutions that emerge in the historical development of every society and must be learned 
by every individual in the course of his or her socialization.  
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If economics is understood as the science that deals with the ever-changing world of 
economic phenomena, then to explain these phenomena we must consider the cul-
tural conditionality under which economic acts (and thought) occur. Because society 
can only be understood considering the cultural “backdrop”, and because every 
member of society learns in its ontogeny again and again how to act and think 
through interaction with society, culture is an integral part of socio-scientific expla-
nation. The ratchet effect of culture forces every individual to reconstruct correspond-
ing structures analogous to the ones of his conspecifics in an act of ‘guided reinvention’ 
(Lock 1980). Starting with its birth the human organism is subject to the coercion to de-
velop the ability to act in a given social and material context. Without discussing this 
here in any length, anthropology must be understood as an important ancillary science 
of economic theory (Goldschmidt and Remmele 2004). Consequently, theoretical re-
flections on economic phenomena, as well as the possibilities of political economic 
reforms and company strategies, are always tied to specific social and cultural con-
ditions. A successful theory of economic development can therefore be understood 
as a cultural theory of economics – in keeping with evolutionary anthropology as an 
integral part and an endogenous explanatory variable of cumulative cultural evolu-
tion.3 
 
What are the consequences for an adequate theory of the transition processes?  
 
(1) A theory of transition must be an institutional theory. It deals with the system-
atic analysis of social rules and with the question of how societal conditions are 
formed. 
(2)  A theory of institutional change is concerned with formal and informal institu-
tions, i.e. formal rules and informal constraints. The interplay between these two 
types of rules is fundamental in understanding economic development.  
(3)  The concept of path dependency points to the long-term significance of informal 
constraints as the “fertile cultural ground” from which economic processes stem. 
(4) Consequently, culture is not viewed as a “residual factor” of economic develop-
ment, but – in keeping with evolutionary anthropology – is to be understood as 
                                                 
3  Our suggested method is similar to Herrmann-Pillath’s approach of an “economic cultural research 
agenda on transition” (wirtschaftskulturelle Transformationsforschung). Parallels can be drawn espe-
cially to his idea of culture as a constructive as well as communicative process driven by individual 
action. Furthermore, his assertion that history is an integrative part of culture corresponds to our em-
phasis on path-dependency. Cf. Herrmann-Pillath (1999) and (2000). 
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an integral part and an endogenous explanatory variable of cumulative cultural 
evolution.  
(5) Thus, institutional change is bound to its cultural context as the prevailing infor-
mal constraint. To understand transformation processes means understanding the 
interplay between culture and (establishing new) formal rules. Therefore, the pos-
sibilities of political economic reforms are always tied to specific social and cul-
tural conditions. 
 
 
3 Holistic and extended orders 
 
In the introduction we said that there are two groups of transition countries: The coun-
tries of the first group (the Baltic States, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and Croatia) have been consistent in their implementation of ‘Westernizing’ reforms, 
whereas the countries of the second group (Russia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldavia, the 
Ukraine, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro) still seem to lack a broadly shared vision on 
the future outlook of society. If we ask what the countries within these two groups have 
in common, we will quickly come across the fact in all countries of the first group the 
‘Western’ versions of Christianity – Catholicism and Protestantism – dominate, whereas 
different versions of Eastern Orthodoxy prevail in the countries of the second group. We 
shall emphasize that we cannot claim originality for the thesis that the divide between 
‘Latin’ and Orthodox Christianity is of decisive importance for the process of transition. 
The issue has been originally raised by historians and social scientists (Huntington 
1993; Stark and Bruszt 1998; Wallace and Haerpfer 1998; Goehrke 2000) and in eco-
nomics it has been highlighted by Stephan Panther (1997, 1998, 2000) in a number of 
contributions.4  
                                                 
4 Since, to our knowledge, Panther was the first economist to deal with this question, we shall briefly 
summarize his main line of argumentation: His central idea is to apply Robert Putnam’s (1993) con-
cept of civicness to the case of CE & EE. According to Putnam, the key feature of civicness is that it 
provides values and norms, promoting the development of what is often called “extended trust”: In a 
non-civic society trust is typically restricted to the members of relatively small personal networks (of-
ten between kin). Hence, the individuals treat members of their own personal networks in a different 
way than those they are not acquainted with personally. Although people still behave differently to-
wards kin and friends than to strangers, they generally treat other people as equals. The resulting ex-
tended trust in political terms promotes the participation of the individuals in public affairs, and in 
economic terms thwarts opportunistic behavior and hence lowers transaction costs. As much as we 
appreciate Putnam’s approach and Panther’s contributions in applying these ideas to CE & EE, with 
Eckehard F. Rosenbaum (2001, 893) we see the decisive problem of the chosen approach in that it is 
unable to explain the historical causes of the emergence and evolution of social capital. For an in-
depth critique of Panther see Wagener (2002). Furthermore, it seems not implausible that the “extend 
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The all-decisive problem of theorizing the historical and cultural dimensions of eco-
nomic activity is their specificity. Therefore their consideration always raises the ques-
tion of the possibility or impossibility of general theories in the social sciences.5 With-
out being able to go into the details of this problem: We hold that the historical and cul-
tural dimension of transition can only be properly understood when analyzed on the ba-
sis of a well-defined general approach. It is the case of the German Historical School 
that underlines the necessity of such a general approach: Disregarding theoretical and 
causal explanation implies the danger of reducing even such phenomena to historical 
specificity which could analyzed sufficiently in a general theoretical framework.6 Ac-
cordingly, we will develop such a theoretical framework that shall hopefully enable us 
to come closer to an understanding of the interaction between formal rules, informal 
constraints and culture in the two transitions in CE & EE. This framework is purely 
structuralist, i.e. it does not include specific factors but provides the background on 
which the influence of culture and history can be made observable.  
 
Our analysis is based on a comparison between two ideal types of social organization: 
the holistic and the extended, functionally differentiated order.7 A holistic society is 
characterized by an ideology or religion that claims validity for all spheres of action and 
thought. Hence, whatever the individual does, he or she will do it in a way that does not 
violate general binding moral prescripts, imposed by a superior authority and learned in 
the course of socialization. In a society where general binding moral prescripts govern 
men’s conduct, there will not be much functional differentiation.8 Functional differen-
tiation means that people act according to an economic, i.e. capitalistic logic, when buy-
ing and selling things, to a political logic, when searching for solutions to political prob-
lems, to a juridical logic when judging a crime and so on. Yet if everything – as in a ho-
listic society – is subordinated to the one and only religious or political rationality, it 
                                                                                                                                               
trust” of modern societies is more often the result of a sufficient set of institutional rules than an out-
come of an unspecific form of “civicness”. However, we cannot discuss this problem here. 
5  The issue of historical specificity has been put back on agenda of methodological discourse in eco-
nomics by Geoffrey Hodgson in his book How Economics forgot History (2001).  
6  Thus, our approach is based on what Hayek calls “explanations of the principle” and “pattern predic-
tions” (Hayek 1967, 11; 1952/1979, 86; cf. Vanberg 2004a, 166). 
7  Note that we use the term “extended order” slightly differently than Hayek. Following Hayek (1988, 
6), to “understand our civilization, one must appreciate that the extended order resulted not from hu-
man design or intention but spontaneously”. While Hayek stresses the superiority of the extended or-
der (‘capitalism’) due to its capacity to use information, we focus on the functional differentiation of 
societal processes in such an order. However, it is obvious that these understandings of extended or-
der are closely connected. 
8  For an introduction into the paradigm of social differentiation in the social sciences see Alexander 
(ed.) (1990); Schimank (2000).  
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follows suit that there cannot emergence different ‘value spheres’ (Max Weber). In an 
extended order, by contrast, there is no sole generally binding logic according to which 
the system is organized, but a multitude of competing rationalities. The functioning of 
an extended order does not rest on “common concrete ends” (Hayek 1988, 64), but on 
highly formal and abstract rules. Extended societies are composed of different subsys-
tems, functioning according to their own kind of rationality.  
 
The historical path of Western Europe, beginning in the Middle Ages, can ideal-
typically be described as a development from a holistic to an extended order. In the 
Middle Ages, the religious dogma provided concrete prescripts for every kind of action 
and thought, and, as Karl Pribram ([1951] 1983, 587) aptly put it, “the firm belief in a 
hierarchical structure of eternally valid general notions found its counterpart in an 
equally rigid social and economic organization”.9 Now, the more hierarchical a society 
is the more social relations are personalized. The reason for this is that power as a me-
dium of social control has a much lower coverage than abstract media like money or the 
general law. Such media are indeed necessary to extend the social order beyond per-
sonal acquaintance, whereas where hierarchical power relations are dominant, people 
are necessarily tied into relatively small groups. Where this is the case and where hence 
the individual is not used to interact with persons she is not personally acquainted with, 
she is likely to behave towards them in a much different way than towards the members 
of the community she lives in: In holistic societies there is to be found a polarity be-
tween solidarity among kin and the attitude of hostility towards strangers. Appropri-
ately, Max Weber (1958, 303-4) differentiated in this context between external and in-
ternal morals (Binnen- und Außenmoral) as a decisive attribute of pre-modern socie-
ties.10 
 
The post-medieval development of Western Europe was characterized by a sequence of 
differentiation processes, as a result of which society eventually turned into a system of 
self-organizing subsystems interacting within the framework of an extended total order. 
                                                 
9  Note that in this quotation nothing is said about a possible causality between ideas and social struc-
tures, and nor shall we ourselves make any assertions about this issue. 
10  Max Weber’s contribution is mainly a terminological nature, however, for the phenomenon itself it 
had been widely discussed in German social science during the second half of the 19th century, see 
e.g. Simmel (1890, 48), Schmoller ([1900] 1920, 65-6). And not only in Germany: Likewise, Alfred 
Marshall stated in his Principles that “a primitive society … prescribes an attitude of hostility to 
strangers.” Albeit Marshall emphasizes that in modern society “the ties of family are in many ways 
stronger than before”, he is convinced that “sympathy with those who are strangers to us is a growing 
source of a kind of deliberate unselfishness, that never existed before the modern age.” (Marshall 
1930, 6). 
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As what mainly interests us here is the transition from feudalism or socialism11 to capi-
talism, we shall concentrate on the institutional changes taking place on this threshold. 
In Western Europe the feudal age came to a close when the ascending bourgeoisie chal-
lenged the claim to power of the sovereigns. In doing so it relied on classical liberalism, 
which demanded an institutional separation between the political and economic spheres 
of society, a demand that was realized in the first decades of the 19th century in the 
Western part of Europe. Both democracy and the exchange economy are prime exam-
ples of spontaneous, self-organizing systems interacting within the framework of a 
spontaneous total system (see DiZerega 1989). To us, the decisive question is how the 
process of social differentiation related to the corresponding informal institutions, which 
are prerequisite to the functioning of an extended order. Here, we shall concentrate on 
the economy, but it is worth stressing that the basic principle is the same for all ‘value 
spheres’ of modern societies.  
 
When describing the social structure of the Middle Ages we argued that abstract media 
of social interaction are a prerequisite for the emergence of an extended order. Money is 
the classic example of such a medium. However, although money is undoubtedly one of 
the central institutions of a market economy, up to the present day even within institu-
tional and evolutionary economics surprisingly little research has been done into the 
role of money in the process of social and cultural evolution. This is all the more aston-
ishing, because over a hundred years ago the German sociologist Georg Simmel ([1900] 
1907) in his Philosophy of Money provided a masterly analysis of how the institution of 
money brings into existence the informal institutions that are basic to the functioning of 
an extended order.12 According to Simmel, in the Western societies money has played 
the decisive role in the “general tendency... of making the individual more and more de-
pendent upon the achievements of the people, but less and less dependent upon the per-
sonalities that lie behind them” (Simmel [1900] 2001, 296).13 On the one hand it is an 
                                                 
11  It has often been argued that Soviet socialism has much in common with the feudalist state. Both in 
feudalism and in socialism the process of social differentiation is restricted by the power interests of 
the absolute sovereign and the socialist nomenklatura respectively, claiming to represent the interests 
of a collective of people: the nation in the one case, the working class in the other. 
12  One of the few appraisals of Georg Simmel by economists is David Laidler’s and Nicholas Rowe’s 
remarkable essay “Georg Simmel's ‘Philosophy of money’ – a review article for economists” (1980). 
We know only one attempt to apply Simmel’s ideas to the problem of transition (Gajo and Rusi 
2000), which in our opinion, however, does not fully do justice to the theoretical framework of the 
Philosophy of Money.  
13  As this translation is rather imprecise, we will provide the original text: „Die allgemeine Tendenz 
geht aber zweifellos dahin, das Subjekt zwar von den Leistungen immer mehrer [sic!] [omitted in the 
English translation!] Menschen abhängig, von den dahinterstehenden Persönlichkeiten als solchen 
aber immer unabhängiger zu machen“ (Simmel [1900] 1907, 313).  
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important means to establish – often over great spatial distances – contacts with people 
whom the individual will never meet personally. The formal institution of money takes 
over functions that in former times had been provided by family and friends, and there-
fore it makes the individuals less dependent on these close personal ties. At the same 
time, the awareness of being dependent on the action of countless people whom one is 
not personally familiar with, may be seen as the greatest incentive to treat all other per-
sons as equals and hence to overcome the gap between external and internal morals.14  
 
However, we always have to consider one crucial aspect in analyzing extended orders: 
In societies based on functional differentiation the degree of possible moral coercion is 
much lower than in face-to-face communities such as families. This fact leads to two 
consequences: First, although the need to develop the ability to act in a small and famil-
iar social context in every ontogeny means also to develop moral “skills”, these skills 
are of less importance for acting in a extended order. Second, because specific formal 
institutional ties of specific developments change the ontogenetic conditions of con-
struction in their entirety – i.e. that the functional differentiation of society is regarded 
as a “conventional” fact of society – the difference between the moral dimension 
learned in face-to-face relations (family) while growing up and the goal-oriented action 
in the larger society are not perceived as diametrically opposed, because both are 
learned as integrating social rules.15 Consequently, there is only a small gap between the 
perception of social rules in the extended order and those moral rules learned in the 
face-to-face community. Or, to put it differently: the already mentioned differentiation 
between ‘internal morals’ and ‘external morals’ as introduced by Max Weber16 plays 
                                                 
14  The kind of social relations that are brought about by an extended order have already been described 
by Adam Smith in his Theory of Moral Sentiments. It is well known that Smith’s theory was directed 
against Thomas Hobbes, whose ideas had provided the intellectual background of the absolutist age 
(see e.g. Perlman and McCann 1998, 35-53). Smith’s central idea and political message was that the 
individuals’ ability to put themselves into the position of their fellow men, and hence also to see 
themselves through the eyes of other persons, was sufficient to maintain a stable organization of so-
cial relations, so that order did not need to be imposed ‘from above’. For the purpose of our study it is 
crucial to understand that fellow-feeling with strangers is not, as Smith assumed, an inherent part of 
human nature. Rather, it is the result of socialization in a functionally differentiated society. As men-
tioned above, the double process of enhancing weak, impersonal ties between non-familiar people 
and weakening strong, personal ties with kin and close friends is not restricted to economic relations. 
Rather, this is the core principle of the type of Vergesellschaftung in modern Western societies.  
15  This insight should be added to Denzau and North’s concept of shared mental models. While they 
stress that institutions are “a reflection of the evolving mental models” (Denzau and North 1994, 22) 
it remains unclear in which way the process of ‘inculturation’ of social rules could be interpreted 
from an anthropological point of view.  
16  Note that the term ‘external morals’ is somewhat misleading. Extended orders are not ruled by moral 
values (in the sense of taking the interests of others into consideration) but by abstract social rules.  
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only an subordinate part in the extended order. The formal institutions which justify 
outside morals are included in the process of socialization.  
 
The opposite is true for holistic societies. If these societies are characterized by an ide-
ology or religion that claims validity for all spheres of action and thought, then there is a 
sharp distinction between ‘internal morals’ and ‘external morals’, a distinction between 
‘us’ and ‘them’. It is based on the perception of mutual respect among the members of 
the same tribe, religious community or family as well as on the perception of every out-
sider as an ‘enemy’. Thus, the implementation of new formal institutions (in the process 
of transformation) is experienced by the member of such societies as a ‘strange’ element 
and as a large gap between ‘inside morals’ and (underdeveloped) ‘external morals’. This 
highlights the necessity to perceive the relative autonomy of formal rules and informal 
constraints and underlines that there could be a conflict between coexisting and compet-
ing formal rules and informal constraints – an aspect perhaps underestimated in North’s 
work (cf. Fiori 2002, 1030 f.).  
 
In this section, we have tried to clarify the connection between the differentiation proc-
esses at different levels of the social system: Overcoming the belief in one set of gener-
ally binding religious and/or ideological dogmas and functional differentiation of differ-
ent ‘value spheres’ of society are mutually connected processes. Only functionally dif-
ferentiated subsystems of society can be organized with the help of highly specialized 
media of communication, such as money. And these abstract media of exchange, by ob-
jectifying personal relations, promote the emergence of extended trust. We are now able 
to summarize our elaboration on the two ideal types “holistic society” and “extended 
order” in the following table: 
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Figure 1: Holistic and extended orders 
 
 Holistic society Extended order 
Type of Ideology  Belief in an orthodox religion 
or political ideology, claiming 
absolute and eternal truth for 
all kinds of action and 
thought. 
Multitude of possible inter-
pretations of social reality. 
Degree of functional  
differentiation, espe-
cially relation between 
polity and economy  
No or little functional differ-
entiation between different 
spheres of society, especially 
no clear separation between 
economy and polity. 
Clear functional differentia-
tion between the different 
spheres of society, clear 
boundary between polity and 
economy.  
Dominant type of social 
relations 
Dominance of personal rela-
tions within relatively small 
personal networks, large gap 
between internal and external 
morals. 
Dominance of depersonalized 
relations, weakening of small 
networks, small gap between 
internal and external morals.  
 
It is understood that these ideal types were, are and will be realized nowhere in their 
pure forms. In almost every society there exist some religious or ideological dogmas 
that are seldom called into question, the boundaries between the different subsystems 
are never impermeable, and it is hard to imagine a society in which all social relations 
are fully depersonalized. Nevertheless, these ideal types help us to understand the two 
processes of transition that have taken place in CE & EE. In a first step we will outline 
the evolution of these societies in very general terms, leaving aside all differences be-
tween the individual countries. In a second step we will broaden the argument by con-
sidering the different developmental stages the countries had reached at the eve of so-
cialist transition, and finally we will take into account the role of specific cultural and 
historical factors. 
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4 The countries of CE & EE between the holistic and the extended order 
 
Compared to Western Europe, all the CE countries went through catch-up development. 
Before they were re-organized according to socialist principles in the aftermath of 
World War II, they all had – to a greater or lesser degree – participated in Western 
Europe’s development from a holistic to an extended order. Yet as historical latecomers 
they had not fully arrived at modernity when the Second World War brought this devel-
opment to an abrupt halt. In the inter-war period, any generally binding religion or po-
litical ideology previously prevalent in these countries had been replaced by a multitude 
of possible interpretations of social reality. In most of them, however, there were strong 
nationalist movements, demanding to subordinate all action and thought to the interests 
of the national state (in detail, see Sugar and Lederer (eds.) 1994; Banac and Verdery 
(eds.) 1995). The connection between political and economic nationalism was extremely 
tight in the CE societies, so that they are often even regarded as prime examples of eco-
nomic nationalism (see e.g. Kofman 1997; Berend 2000). 
 
Neither the economic nor the political systems that existed in the CE countries on the 
eve of socialist reconstruction can be characterized as extended. It is true that after 
World War I in all of them democratic systems had been established, but these were not 
to last long. With the exception of Czechoslovakia, in all countries of CE the young 
democracies had been replaced by autocratic systems by the early 1930s (see Crampton 
[1994] 1997, 33).17 If our presumption is correct that there is a mutual dependency of 
social differentiation or ‘extendedness’ of society at its different levels, we can assume 
that personal relations in these societies were also of a less extended type than in West-
ern Europe. Small, personal networks and a significant gap between internal and exter-
nal morals are likely to have still prevailed.  
 
                                                 
17  Of course, this development must be seen before the background of the overall autocratic tendencies 
in Europe at that time, and we simply do not know how things would have developed without the Oc-
tober Revolution and World War II. However, from a scientific perspective, there is no reason to ide-
alize the pre-Soviet history of the Central European nations. If today intellectuals in these countries 
tend to do so, however, this fulfils an important function in the process of defining a new political 
identity. 
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Now it would be a severe mistake to assume that these societies each as a whole were 
characterized by a structure that lies somewhere between our two ideal types. Rather, 
countries passing through catch-up development are typically distinguished by a co-
existence of the old and the new, and often there emerges a tension between these poles: 
While the well-educated urban population comes into close contact with the culture of 
the more advanced countries, little changes in the life and thought of the not so well-
educated rural population which tends to oppose the structural changes. The social ten-
sion usually finds its expression in fierce ideological clashes between advocates and op-
ponents of the modernization processes. The conflict of opposed patterns of life and 
thought makes catch-up development an extremely volatile path of social development, 
for the risk of a counter-revolution against modernity is always given (see also Zwey-
nert 2004). When the co-existence of the two patterns is taken into account, a rough ap-
proximation of the developmental path from the holistic society to the extended order 
can be illustrated in figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: The potential conflict between holistic and extended patterns 
 
 
This very simple graph illustrates that in the course of the development from the holistic 
to the extended order (bottom-up movement) holistic and extended patterns of action 
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and thought co-exist but change their relative positions. Leaving external shocks, such 
as wars and economic crises, aside for the moment, we can assume that the clashes be-
tween holistic and extended patterns will reach their peak in the marked field, where the 
ratio between holistic and extended patterns is close to 1. It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to decide to what degree each of the countries of CE had already passed the ‘criti-
cal zone’. And it makes little sense to speculate about the likelihood of the establish-
ment of totalitarian regimes in any of them without the October Revolution and World 
War II. In fact, at the very same time that the countries of CE introduced democratic 
systems for the first time in their history, an anti-modern counter-revolution happened 
in Russia, a country in which there was a sharp tension between holistic and extended 
patterns when it got roped into the First World War.
18
 In the aftermath of World War II 
the Soviet Union managed to impose her formal institutions on the countries of CE & 
EE. The people in these societies now were forced to acculturate to the Soviet Union.19 
In the foregoing section we have briefly explained what we think are the decisive fea-
tures of Western European social evolution. In order to understand the forced accultura-
tion of the countries of CE to the Soviet Union, we now have to look into the basic fea-
tures of Russian social and economic development before the revolution.  
 
Most experts on Russian history agree that it was the Orthodox tradition that set the 
country apart from the developmental path of Western Europe. It has often been argued 
that the differentiation processes that in Western Europe were initiated by the competi-
tion between the religious and the secular powers, were blocked in the Orthodox East by 
the far-reaching amalgamation between the two within the framework of the patrimonial 
state (see Müller-Armack [1945] 1951, 350; Pipes [1971] 1992, chap. 9; Buss 2003, 
chap. 2). Therefore, in Russia the whole chain of differentiation processes, formative for 
the evolution of Western Europe, did not occur – at least not endogenously.20 In view of 
its impact on Russia’s acculturation to Western modernity the decisive feature of the 
Russian Orthodox religious tradition is its extreme holism.21 The world view of the 
                                                 
18  World War I as an external political shock played a decisive role in the development of CE & EE. 
But while in Russia it led to the political de-stabilization of an extremely volatile society, it helped 
the CE countries to establish democratic systems. 
19  For a concise overview over the “Different Roads to Socialism” in CE see Swain and Swain ([1993] 
2003, 31-54); in detail, see Berend (1996).  
20  The ‘borderlessness’ within the patrimonial state was certainly partly a reflection of material factors, 
such as the country’s lack of any natural borders, the shortness of the agrarian season and others. Yet 
as we are concerned here mainly with the impact of cultural factors on transition, we shall concen-
trate on the role of the Russian Orthodox legacy on the evolution of Russian society. 
21  “Orthodox thinking is based on representation of things in their wholeness, which means that each 
individual incident falls into a much wider category” (“Some thoughts regarding the preparation of 
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Russian Orthodox Church was holistic not only in the sense that it claimed validity for 
every kind of social action or thought, as was typical also of the medieval Catholic 
Church. More than that, it saw in the wholesomeness of society an end in itself, the final 
aim of history. The contradiction between the Russian Orthodox ideal of a homogenous, 
undifferentiated society and the rationalistic ‘fragmentation’ of Western culture was 
discussed as a central issue by Russia’s Church authorities up to the 18th century.22 The 
idea that there might be a difference between religious and political truth, and that a per-
son could act as a merchant in one way and as a believer in another, ran counter to the 
Orthodox religious dogma that also strongly influenced Russian secular culture (see 
Berdyaev [1937] 1990, 19; Buss 2003, 167). 
 
Now of course Russia did not develop in isolation from the rest of the world. The key to 
understanding her history is that the country was under permanent political, military and 
economic pressure to imitate the more successful Western European institutional set-
tings. By the end of the 17th century it had finally become clear that Russia had desper-
ately fallen behind the other European nations, and with the reign of Peter the Great be-
gan Russia’s forced acculturation to the West (see e.g. Hughes (ed.) 2001; Cracraft 
2004). It would definitely be a mistake to overemphasize – in the style of the Russian 
Slavophiles – the peculiarities of the country’s social evolution. Certainly Russian 
catch-up development was ‘normal’ in the sense that also in other countries economic 
modernization processes were politically implemented in an authoritarian style. And al-
though the social and ideological tensions that arose as a result of the modernization 
process might have been rather stronger in Russia than in other countries, they were not 
a specific phenomenon, but could also be observed in Germany, for instance (see also 
Zweynert 2004). There was one specific – and crucial – difference, however. The set-
tings imported from the West had developed as a result of the process of social differen-
tiation which was in conflict with the holistic legacy of the Orthodox dogma. This is the 
main reason why economic reforms, aiming at the implementation of an exchange 
economy, met with especially fierce resistance in both the broader strata and the edu-
cated classes of the Russian population, and why the transfer of Western institutions of-
ten led to the emergence of strange hybrids between extended and holistic patterns. This 
                                                                                                                                               
the CCPD/WCC Orthodox Consultation on ‘An Orthodox Contribution to the Search for Justice’”, 
quoted in Harakas 1999, 2).  
22  An outstanding elaboration of “Eastern Orthodox Anti-Westernism” has been recently provided by 
Vasilios N. Makrides and Dirk Uffelmann (2003). It is especially commendable that the authors 
(ibid., 87) do not confine their analysis to the intellectual aspects of the issue, but emphasize that “the 
forms of anti-Western attitudes can be observed at the level of statements and expressions as well as 
at the level of behavior and actions”.  
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is best illustrated by the heated debates about the fate of the Russian rural commune, the 
so-called obshchina.23 Indeed, the fact that this collectivist institution was maintained 
even after the abolition of serfdom in 1861 and until as late as 1908 must be seen as one 
of the decisive reasons why the thorough modernization of Russian society failed.24  
 
On the eve of the Bolshevists’ putsch, however, Russia did not only have the highest 
economic growth rates in Europe, she had also entered into an extremely intense and 
fruitful intellectual exchange with Western Europe. Very much speaks in favor of the 
thesis that under luckier historical circumstances Russia could have become a ‘normal’ 
European nation in the early 20th century. At the same time, the Soviet reconstruction 
of Russian society definitely had something to do with cultural patterns which in the 
‘Silver Age’ of Russian culture had more and more taken a back seat. As the Russian 
historian Boris N. Mironov (2000, vol. 2, 333-4) has shown, the Russian Revolution can 
be seen as an attempt to modernize the country on the basis of the pre-modern patterns 
of social organization. In a society that since the 1890s had already significantly ap-
proached the Western world, an all-embracing ideology was implemented yet again. 
This ideology tied in with the traditional creed for the wholesome society: By means of 
violence social differentiation was more or less abolished and the priority of the social 
collective over the individual was revived. Society was pushed from the path towards 
the extended order to that towards the holistic society. 
 
 
                                                 
23  In the second half of the 1850s a heated debate was started in the Russian journals on the issue 
whether in the course of the imminent abolition of serfdom (realized in 1861) the rural commune 
should be dissoluted or whether this institution should be maintained (in more detail see Zweynert 
2002, 206-10). Only a small group of liberals favored the former alternative, arguing that because of 
its collectivist character the commune formed a major obstacle to both the economic and the political 
development of the country. However, the obshchina was vigorously defended by a coalition between 
socialists and romanticists. For both camps the idea that the individual can and should exist without 
being bound into a social collective ran counter to the core of their ideological convictions that were 
– and this is the decisive point – shaped by the same holistic tradition. 
24  In his remarkable paper “A Model of Network Capitalism: Basic Ideas and post-Soviet Evidence” 
Anton Oleinik (2004a) has put forth the thesis that the peculiar features of today’s Russian network 
capitalism can partly be explained by the patterns of social interaction shaped by the institution of the 
obshchina. It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal with this controversial issue, see the debate be-
tween Barnett (2004) and Oleinik (2004b). 
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5 The two transitions in CE & EE and the transfer of institutions 
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War the Stalinist model of a wholesome society, a 
strange hybrid of modern and pre-modern patterns, was imposed upon the countries of 
CE & EE (in detail, see Part II of Ramet (ed.) 1998). The implementation of the formal 
institutions of Soviet society pushed all these countries from one developmental path to 
another. If for centuries they had slowly and gradually approached the West, they were 
now forced to acculturate to the East.  
 
In all countries concerned, the implementation of socialist institutions led to a deep-
going de-modernization of social relations at all levels of society:25 The multitude of 
competing interpretations of reality was replaced by the rule of a generally binding ide-
ology. Functional differentiation of society was drastically reduced because all social 
subsystems were subordinated to and made a function of the political system. Not as 
obvious is the question of how social relations (that is, the micro-level of our ideal-type 
comparison) were affected by socialist reconstruction. We again restrict our analysis to 
the economic sphere. In the third section we have argued that the institution of money 
played a decisive role in extending social relations beyond the limits of personal ties. In 
order to understand the impact of the planned economy it is important to be aware that 
the socialist shortage economies were only apparently monetized barter systems (Kornai 
1980, vol. 2, 544). The permanent shortage of goods of all kind forced the individuals – 
both in the spheres of production and consumption – to build personal redistribution 
networks. Within these networks, the factor that decided over success or failure of a 
transaction was the personal relation to the people able to supply the demanded good 
(Srubar 1991, 422). Yet the shortage economy did not only lead to a re-personalization 
of economic relations. More than that the only possibility to redirect resources into 
one’s own network of personal ties was to detract them from the official economy. Con-
sequently, opportunistic behavior towards ‘big’ society and solidarity with family and 
close friends was a central element in the economic socialization of the individual in a 
planned economy. In other words: Under the conditions of the shortage economy the 
gap between internal and external morals was revived, or, formulated in other terms: 
Social differentiation, one of the most important prerequisites of a functioning market 
economy, was yet again replaced with personalized trust.  
                                                 
25  At the same time, Soviet modernization brought about technical progress, which in the medium and 
long run also led to urbanization and other forms of modernization. Nevertheless, as far as the struc-
ture of social relations is concerned, we can speak of de-modernization processes.  
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At this point we must conclude the structural explanation and ask what the specific his-
torical and cultural patterns were that determined the degree to which the different 
countries moved towards the holistic society. Both the unsolicited acculturation to 
Western Europe and the forced acculturation to the Soviet Union can be described as 
transfers of institutions. As outlined in the introduction, the decisive problem of institu-
tional transfer is the compatibility between imported formal rules and the informal insti-
tutions prevailing in the receiving country. In the case of full compatibility, the adapta-
tion to the imported formal rules will be relatively quick and smooth. In the case of par-
tial or full incompatibility, the adaptation to new formal institutions will take much 
more time and in the worst case there will emerge a gap between formal rules and real 
behavior, resulting in disorder and welfare losses. But then, the imported market institu-
tions’ intended legal and economic incentives have either no effect or they might even 
provoke practices that counteract the intentions of the original institutional design. The 
ensuing uncertainty about the behaviour of transaction partners and the missing cer-
tainty of the law lead to a personalization of economic relations, to corruption and the 
creation of criminal network structures, all of which produce least a minimum degree of 
social stability, however in a very sub-optimal way. In his important paper on “Institu-
tional traps” (2001b) Viktor M. Polterovich has explained a whole range of dysfunc-
tions in/of the Russian economy, such as barter, arrears, tax evasion and corruption with 
the gap between imported formal institutional settings and the informal constraints that 
govern economic behavior.  
 
When acculturating to Western Europe, the CE & EE countries imported social institu-
tions that were a result of and reflected the key feature of the Western European devel-
opmental path: social differentiation. In order to catch up with the advanced nations, all 
of these countries had to pass much quicker through the different developmental stages 
than the Western European countries. Hence, there was much less time to cope with the 
tensions caused by the modernization process, and this made the political development 
somewhat volatile. The decisive specific difference within the group of countries of CE 
& EE was that the ‘Latin’ nations had participated to a higher extent in the cultural de-
velopments that formed an inseparable part of the Western European path towards the 
extended order. For centuries they had not only imported the ‘hardware’ of formal insti-
tutions, but had also participated – at least partly – in the differentiation process that 
formed the ‘software’ of the institutional settings. This is not to say, however, that in the 
Orthodox countries the attempt to import Western European institutions was doomed to 
failure. As formal and informal institutions are mutually connected, the imported formal 
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institutions clearly stimulated the development of ‘fitting’ informal institutional ar-
rangements. But as the original setting of informal institutions in the Orthodox countries 
was significantly less compatible with the imported Western institutions than it was in 
the ‘Latin’ ones, the process of acculturation took more time, and the tensions between 
formal and informal settings as well as the division of society into advocates and oppo-
nents of the modernization process were significantly stronger. 
 
If this thesis is correct, it follows suit that the opposite was true for the acculturation to 
the East, when the Soviet Union imposed her institutional settings upon the countries of 
CE & EE. The formal institutions imported from Soviet Russia were quite incompatible 
with the informal institutional settings prevailing in the ‘Latin’ countries. Perhaps it was 
especially the feeling among the people of these countries that they belonged to Western 
Europe which prevented the growing together of native and imported institutions.26 In 
the Orthodox countries the informal institutions were more compatible with the im-
ported formal Soviet institutions, because the de-differentiation process was in accor-
dance with the holistic legacy of Orthodoxy. The different degree of cultural compati-
bility explains why the implementation of Soviet institutions had a qualitatively differ-
ent impact on the countries concerned: All of them experienced de-modernization proc-
esses and developed in direction of a holistic society, but in the Orthodox countries due 
to the higher degree of compatibility between the externally imposed formal settings 
and the internal informal institutions this movement went significantly further than in 
the ‘Latin’ countries. Therefore, it can be expected that Soviet socialism widened the 
cultural gap between the Orthodox and the ‘Latin’ countries.  
 
In the first half of the 1990s, this gap was concealed by the overall hey-day of political 
and economic liberalism, when all countries of CE & EE expressed the desire to turn 
into societies of the Western European type. In the meanwhile, however, it has become 
obvious that these ideas have gained a much more stubborn foothold in the ‘Latin’ than 
in the Orthodox countries.27 A typical feature of the Orthodox countries is that freedom 
                                                 
26  Nevertheless, the case of Eastern Germany clearly shows that less than 50 years of Soviet socialism 
were enough to establish ‘fitting’ informal institutions. And the fact that today, 15 years after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, there still exist significant differences between Eastern and Western Germany in 
key attitudes towards the economy and politics clearly indicates that the impact of politically imposed 
formal institutions on informal behavioral constraints should not be underrated (see Lehmann-
Waffenschmidt and Böhmer 2004).  
27  At the present moment there are roughly two and a half times more liberal deputies in the parliaments 
of the ‘Latin’ countries than in those of the Orthodox ones, where the number of Communist parlia-
mentarians is four times higher than in the ‘Latin’ countries (the authors’ own calculations on the ba-
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of opinion is suppressed. As we have argued above, belief in the absolute and eternal 
truth of a religious or political dogma is a key feature of a holistic society. The compati-
bility between Soviet ideological patterns and the Orthodox tradition may explain why 
freedom of expression in the Orthodox countries is much more difficult to realize than 
in the ‘Latin’ ones. It is particularly telling that this is not only true for the former Soviet 
Republics, but also, as the European Commission stresses in its recent monitoring re-
ports on these countries, for Bulgaria (see Commission of the European Communities 
2004 a, 22) and Romania (see Commission of the European Communities 2004 b, 26). 
The fact that socialist dictatorship did not last longer in Romania and Bulgaria than in 
the other formerly socialist countries clearly speaks for the importance of the Orthodox 
legacy as the predominant cultural factor. 
 
The borderline between the polity and the economy is much more blurred in the Ortho-
dox than in the ‘Latin’ countries. This clearly emanates from the 2004 annual report 
“Economic Freedom in the World” provided by the Fraser Institute28 and the Transpar-
ency International 2004 annual report.29 Not only in Belarus, but also in Russia the po-
litical elite clearly tries to regain power over big business. The startling case of Lukoil 
and its director Chordokovskii has drawn the attention of a broader public to the Krem-
lin’s attempts to gain control of the key positions in the Russian economy (see Momm-
sen 2003). As cited above (in footnote 14), Adam Smith held that it was not necessary 
to impose order from above, because fellow-feeling provided stable social relations. In 
the history of the social sciences there has been much debate on the issue whether this 
assumption on human nature – or more precisely: the nature of social relations – is valid 
in all places and at all times. The transition experience suggests that it is not. When 
Western institutions are imposed upon a society in which there is a gap between internal 
and external morals, there is a high risk that the individuals will use the freedom an ex-
                                                                                                                                               
sis of the website “Parties and Elections in Europe“ [www.parties-and-elections.de] by Wolfram 
Nordsieck.  
28  On average, the ‘Latin’ countries reached position 47 out of 123, whereas the average rating of the 
Orthodox countries was position 105. Again, the recent monitoring reports of the European Commis-
sion provide evidence that this problem is by no means restricted to the former Soviet Republics but 
forms a decisive obstacle to Bulgaria’s (Commission for the European Communities 2004 a, 19) and 
Romania’s (Commission for the European Communities 2004 b, 21-23) accession to the EU. Simi-
larly, Pejovich analyzes the influence of culture on economic transition processes using the “Index of 
Economic Freedom” by the Heritage Foundation. His conclusion, that a conflict of the formal rules 
with the prevailing informal rules will raise transaction costs and reduce the production of wealth in 
the community, tallies with our findings. Cf. Pejovich (2003). 
29  While the ‘Latin’ transition countries reach averagely position 45 out of 133 monitored countries, the 
Orthodox countries are on average at position 86. 
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tended order offers to opportunistic behavior towards ‘big’ society in order to benefit 
their own personal network(s). 
The problems at the three levels of society are mutually dependent: Where liberal ideas 
are weak and not deeply rooted in the minds of the political and scientific elite, market 
reforms are unlikely to be put through rigorously. If the resulting weakness of the for-
mal institutions is reinforced by informal institutional settings contradicting the market 
order, the emerging order may even combine ‘the worst of two worlds’. This can lead to 
the political demand to abandon all attempts to follow an ‘alien’ developmental path 
that allegedly does not fit the domestic traditions, and to return to a national model of 
social development. The Orthodox countries, which during the last years have increas-
ingly restored elements of the old order, seem to be excellent examples of the path de-
pendency of institutional change: The political changes of the early 1990s initially led to 
attempts to radically change the formal political and economic institutions. But when 
the informal settings in these societies did not keep up with the speed of development, 
there emerged a gap between formal and informal institutions. The resulting disorder 
and welfare losses then seem to have induced a re-adaptation of the formal institutions 
to the informal settings, so that hybrid structures between the old and the new have now 
emerged. As much as this experience gives evidence of the persistence and power of 
past developments: The ‘orange revolution’ in the Ukraine has clearly shown that the 
turning away from the principles of an extended order observed in Belarus and increas-
ingly also in Russia is not the pre-determined result of the Orthodox heritage. Consid-
eration of the cultural dimension of systemic change in CE & EE should not lead to cul-
tural fatalism. Quite on the contrary, it should help us not only to reach a better under-
standing of transition, but also to develop political strategies that take into account its 
cultural dimension. 
 
 
6 Implications for economic policy-making 
 
The theorem of path dependency in institutional economics implicitly emanates from 
the assumption that national cultures are to a high degree homogenous, so that certain 
‘cultural constants’ determine the trajectory of institutional change. On the one hand, 
our central thesis that the transition processes in CE & EE have been decisively influ-
enced by the ‘Latin’ and the Orthodox versions of Christianity, is fully in line with this 
assumption. On the other hand, we have called into question the assumption of cultural 
homogeneity by arguing that the process of catch-up development can also be described 
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as a transfer of institutions (in analogy to our understanding of culture as a dynamic, 
evolutionary process): In the case of CE & EE the different religious traditions seem to 
have had an important impact on the relative strength of holistic and extended patterns 
of behavior and thought. The acculturation to the West was more difficult in the Ortho-
dox countries, because the legacy of the Orthodox belief was in potential conflict with 
the imported Western institutions. This strengthened the anti-modernist sentiments, and 
hence the cultural and ideological division was stronger in these countries.  
 
This, as we are convinced, more feasible view of the connection between cultural pat-
terns and economic development does not call into question the historical and cultural 
specificity of countries or cultural areas, but it challenges the unrealistic assumption that 
societies develop in isolation from each other. Just now, in the so-called ‘age of global-
ization’ it should be clear that, as Carsten Hermann-Pillath (1999, 48) aptly puts it, one 
should speak of “transculturality” rather than of national cultures: If the process of 
catch-up development is interpreted as a transfer of institutions, it does indeed become 
clear that the decisive problem is not the (economic) culture of the receiving country as 
such, but rather its interaction with the imported formal institutions. Our analysis im-
plies that in threshold countries there already exist – more or less – extended patterns, so 
that an important task of developmental policy is to be seen in strengthening these pat-
terns. In our opinion, two dimensions of this problem can be distinguished: One prob-
lem refers to the adaptation of the imported formal institutions to the informal institu-
tions prevailing in the receiving country. Politics in a country which is characterized by 
a strong division between modernists and traditionalists is likely to waver between the 
extremes, and the introduction of painful economic reforms can all to easily lead to a 
counter movement that abandons the road towards the extended order. Therefore, as a 
second problem the question arises how this development may be stabilized.  
 
To begin with the first problem: According to our analysis, the Orthodox countries face 
the dilemma that the Orthodox legacy is potentially in conflict with an extended order. 
This potential contradiction causes problems both at the level of thought (ideology) and 
at the level of action. At the level of action much speaks in favor of the thesis that 
Western political and economic institutions could not simply be transferred to the Or-
thodox countries. Experience has shown that the gap between the informal constraints 
prevailing in the Orthodox countries and the imported (formal) market institutions was 
so wide that the gap often caused the emergence of institutional traps in the form of du-
rable institutional hybrids of holistic and extended patterns. David Stark’s statement that 
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in the course of transition the actors reconstruct organizations and institutions “not on 
the ruins but with the ruins of communism as they redeploy available resources in re-
sponse to their immediate practical dilemmas” (Stark 1996, 995; cf. Stark and Bruszt 
2001, 1130) is particularly true for the interplay between (traditional) informal con-
straints and (imported) formal rules.  
 
Formulated in general terms: if a country imports formal institutions from abroad, the 
compatibility with the prevailing informal constraints must be carefully analyzed. If 
such an analysis leads to the conclusion that there are severe incompatibilities, it must 
be examined how the imported settings can be modified in order to avoid the emergence 
of institutional traps. In case of full incompatibility, however, “second-best solutions” 
(from a neoclassical point of view) are to be preferred to an import of unfitting institu-
tional arrangements (see Oleinik 1998, 27; Goldschmidt 2004b).  
 
At the ideological level it must always be taken into account that in societies where the 
intellectual traditions were shaped by holistic traditions30 the understanding and back-
ing of liberal ideas will be weak. In such a situation it is the task of the politician to to 
guid society not only by adapting reform programs to the prevailing attitudes but also by 
developing marketing strategies that help to ‘sell’ the political vision to a broader pub-
lic.31 This view is fully compatible with the main insight of constitutional economics: 
The actual implementation of a specific social arrangement will be especially credible if 
it is approved of by the parties involved.32 Thus, constitutional economics analyses 
whether reforms are compatible with the existing legal-institutional framework as well 
as whether these reform proposals can be integrated within the existing, socially accept-
able set of rules based on informal constraints. In consequence, constitutional reforms 
should be implemented gradually and on the basis of previous experience, because peo-
ple’s trust in reforms is increased if the reform plans correspond to familiar principles 
and ideas (cf. Goldschmidt 2004c). This way, what legitimizes the policy is the citizens’ 
involvement in the familiar social environment, and not some sort of ‘objective’ eco-
nomic efficiency (see e.g. Vanberg 2004b). 
                                                 
30  As we have shown in another paper, this was also the case in Germany, the intellectual history of 
which strongly resembles that of Russia (Zweynert 2004).  
31  The implementation of the German ‘Social Market Economy’ after World War II is a good example 
of such a strategy. Yet as we have already dealt with that issue in other publications (Zweynert 2004, 
Goldschmidt 2004a), we shall not go into the details here. 
32  Very much in line with this basic idea of constitutional economics, North, Summerhill and Weingast 
(2000, 27) speak of “credible commitments”: “Establishing credible commitments requires the crea-
tion of political institutions that alter the incentives of political officials so that it becomes in their in-
terests to protect the relevant citizen rights”. 
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Let us now turn to the second problem mentioned: After decades of Soviet de-
modernization that have weakened the ‘Western’, modernist branch and strengthened 
the ‘Eastern’ anti-modern one, the Orthodox countries are torn between holistic and ex-
tended patterns at all the three levels described in our ideal types. There is ideological 
dissent between adherents and opponents of modernization. Hence, there is also no con-
sensus on whether society should continue with its attempts to import the formal institu-
tional settings of Western Europe and the USA. Under the conditions of the resulting 
uncertainty, for the economic agents it is absolutely rational to behave in a ‘hybrid’ way 
that ensures survival until it is clear where the journey will go in the end: Many of the 
red directors in Belarus, whose companies survived the early 1990s through inter-
enterprise indebtedness, have now safely returned into the custody of the state. Overall 
uncertainty, resulting from the tension between conflicting patterns of thought and ac-
tion, can easily lead to a call for a strong leader who re-establishes an authoritarian style 
of rulership – this is exactly what one can observe in Belarus and in Russia, as well as in 
other former Soviet Republics.  
 
History shows that this problem is not restricted to the Orthodox countries, for – as 
mentioned above – with the exception of Czechoslovakia on the eve of the Second 
World War all countries of CE had already left the road towards an extended order by 
implementing more or less authoritarian regimes. Also around the middle of the 1990s 
one could observe how as a result of what Janos Kornai called “transformational reces-
sion” (1994) post-communist parties were remarkably successful in the elections in al-
most all CE countries. In this situation, political pressure from without seems to have 
been a decisive stabilizing factor: The prospect of EU membership, which is bound to 
clearly defined conditions, has favored the choice of the ‘Western’ path of development 
both economically and politically. It has to be underlined that this prospect offers not 
only clear economic incentives but also the decisive advantage that the provision of 
painful reforms can be justified with reference to the constraints imposed by the EU au-
thorities. It is understood that not all countries of the ‘Orthodox block’ can be offered to 
become EU members. But still, the Western European countries can be blamed for hav-
ing done too little to promote the feeling of ‘belonging to the West’ in the former Soviet 
Republics by offering a least the prospect of what is now often called ‘privileged part-
nership’. 
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7 Outlook  
 
By announcing the intention to integrate Bulgaria and Romania into the EU in Decem-
ber 1997 the European Council has made a historical decision, the momentousness of 
which is seldom recognized in public debates. Making these countries members of the 
EU means nothing else than attempting to push the centuries-old boundary between the 
‘Latin’ and the Orthodox part of Europe further east. Interestingly, albeit both countries 
still lag much behind their ‘Latin’ neighbors, since the late 1990s both Bulgaria and 
Romania have made significant progress in political and economic reforms and are now 
already positioned somewhere between the two groups in most ratings. At the same 
time, however, the European Commission’s recent reports on “progress towards acces-
sion” in these countries make clear that at the present time they still share the problems 
of the other Orthodox countries in transition. The next few years will provide new in-
sights into the relation between path dependent (endogenous) and (external) politically 
induced institutional change: Will the pressure of the benevolent dictator EU manage to 
set the Orthodox countries on the path to an extended order, or will the Orthodox legacy 
prevent a full ‘Westernization’ of these countries?33 
 
                                                 
33  The framework developed here allows to derive empirically testable hypotheses. This paper forms 
part of a research project in which a so-called “extended order index” has been developed. With the 
help of representative surveys this instrument will provide insights into the prevailing attitude to-
wards the extended order. In summer and autumn of 2004 surveys have been conducted in Latvia, Po-
land and Russia the results of which are soon to be published. 
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